In 2004, Abe et al. proposed a threshold signerambiguous signature scheme from variety of keys. Their scheme is a generalized case of the ring signature scheme, and it allows the key types to be based the trapdoor one-way permutations (TOWP) or sigma-protocols including Schnorr's signature scheme. However, the signed message is public for all, which may result in disputes. In this paper, we present a novel threshold signer-ambiguous signature scheme, having the signed message concealed and keeping who the receivers are secret from variety of keys.
Introduction
For many applications, anonymity is an important issue. As for the digital signature, anonymity could be still amended even though the digital signature is used to authenticate the signer of the corresponding document. In [15] , one motivation for the above scenario comes into being. One of the possible signers can sign the document without the other possible signers' agreement when the signed document may be harmful if exposed to be public. Note that the verifiers know the possible signers instead of the real signer to have the document trustworthy. Consequently, the real signer should be ambiguous instead of anonymous. Thus, signer-ambiguous signature schemes are preferred to be setup-free such that the real signer can select the possible signers at will to make himself/herself be able not to be noticed. On the other hand, in the threshold signature schemes [9, 10, 17] and in the group signature schemes [5] [6] [7] , the possible signers are grouped to be a set after the setup process.
Several proposed schemes [11, 12, 15] can be adopted as setup-free signer-ambiguous signature schemes. The partial knowledge proof CDS [11] leads efficient threshold signer-ambiguous schemes, and it can be combined with other signature schemes based on sigma-protocols such as Schnorr's signature scheme. Nevertheless, the signature schemes based on TOWP cannot be employed in CDS-RSA and Rabin signature schemes [3, 8] for example.
Rivest et al. proposed the ring signature scheme which almost directly adopts TOWP [15] . Bresson et al. proposed a t-out-of-n threshold ring signature scheme with the signature size exponential to the threshold t [4] . Later, a more efficient version was presented such that the signature size is linear to t and n [13] . Meanwhile, Abe et al. presented a modification on the ring signature scheme such that it can be based on both of sigma-protocols and TOWP [1] , where the modification is 1-out-of-n. In 2004, Abe et al. proposed a t-out-of-n signer-ambiguous signature scheme [2] . They claimed that the base signature schemes can be based on sigma-protocols including Schnorr's signature scheme, or TOWP. After analyzing Abe et al.'s scheme, we observe that Schnorr's scheme cannot be directly applied to their scheme, and the base signature based on sigmaprotocols may be insecure.
Preliminaries
In the following, we introduce two types of signature schemes, type-OW and type-3M, which employ TOWP and sigma-protocols, respectively. Type-OW includes schemes such as the variants of RSA signature scheme, Rabin's signature scheme [3, 8] and Paillier's signature scheme [14] , which use one-way trapdoor permutations. Let F, a claw-free permutation, be a one-way trapdoor permutation and I be the corresponding inverse function. F and I are both defined over the space C. Let SK and PK be the involved private and public keys, respectively. Suppose that EM is the encoded message, where EM ∈ C. Then the signature s of EM is I(SK, EM), and EM can be obtained by computing EM = F(PK, s). Note that the verifier may check if EM = F(PK, s) to determine ifr the signature s of EM is valid.
Type-3M, typified by Schnorr's signature scheme, includes schemes derived from the sigma protocols. There are three polynomial-time algorithms A, Z and V performed by the signer and the verifier. The signer commits to a ← A (SK; r), randomly chooses the challenge c and computes s = Z(SK, r, c). The verifier checks if a = V(PK, c, s) to verify the signature.
Abe et al.'s Threshold Signerambiguous Signature Scheme
In this section, the details of Abe et al.'s scheme are shown. First of all, the initialization is presented as follows. Let the set of the involved public keys be G = {PK 1 , PK 2 ,…, PK n }, where the first v keys of G are of type-OW and the others are of type-3M. At least t corresponding private keys are known to the signers. Let p′ be a prime larger than any number in the challenge space C i determined by PK i ∈ G for i = 1, 2,…, n. For i = 1, 2,…, n, let H 0 , H i and K i be hash functions with the hashing results in Z p′ , C i and C i , respectively. The signature scheme is composed of two phases: the signature generation phase and the verification phase described in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. In Subsection 3.3, an example is given.
The Signature Generation Phase
Suppose that (G, t, m) are given, the corresponding signature α is generated as follows.
Step 1 Note that this step is performed by the real signers.
Step 3: z 0 = H 0 (G, t, m, a 1 , a 2 ,…, a n ) is computed, and an (n-t)-degree polynomial P over Z p′ is found, where P(i) = z i .
Step 4: For the real signer U i , he/she computes c i = H i (P(i)) and s i = I i (SK i , a i + c i ) if U i 's key is of type-OW, or he/she computes c i = K i (P(i)) and s i = Z i (SK i , r i , c i ) if U i 's key is of type-3M.
The Verification Phase
While given (G, t, m) and the signature α = (P, s 1 , s 2 ,…, s n ), the verifier performs as follows to verify the signature.
Step 1: If U i 's key is of type-OW, the verifier computes a i = F i (PK i , s i ) -H i (P(i)). Step 2: If U i 's key is of type-3M, the verifier computes a i = V i (PK i , K i (P(i)), s i ).
Step 3: The verifier checks if P(0) = H 0 (G, t, m, a 1 , a 2 ,…, a n ). If it holds, the verifier is convinced that the obtained signature α is valid.
An Example of Abe et al.'s Scheme
In . Let p′ be a prime greater than n 1 , n 2 , p 3 , p 4 Step 2: z 2 is randomly chosen from Z p′ , s 2 is chosen computed. This step is executed by U 1 and U 3 .
Step 3: z 0 = H 0 (G, t, m, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a n ) is computed, and a 3-degree polynomial P over Z p′ is found, where P(0)=z 0 , P(2)=z 2 , P(4)=z 4 , and P(5)=z 5 .
Step 4: U 1 computes c 1 = H 1 (P(1)) and s 1 = Step 3: The verifier checks if P(0) = H 0 (G, t, m, s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 ). If it holds, the verifier is convinced that the obtained signature α is valid.
Schnorr's Signature Scheme
In this section, we review Schnorr's signature scheme [16] . First, two primes, p and q, are chosen, where q is a prime factor of (p-1). Second, a primitive element g is chosen, where g≠1 and g q mod p =1. Note that g, p, and q are all public. For the user U, he/she chooses the private key x less than q and computes the corresponding public key y = g -x mod p. When U wants to sign a message m, he/she performs as follows:
Step 1: Chooses a random number r, less than q, and computes j = g r mod p.
Step 2: Computes a = h(M, j), where h() is a one-way hash function.
Step 3: Computes s = (r + x*a) mod q.
After the three steps, U generates the digital signature (a, s) for M. When the verifier V wants to verify the signature, he/she performs as follows:
Step 1: Computes t′ = g s * y a mod p.
Step 2: Computes a′ = h(M, t′) and checks if a′ equals a. If it holds, V confirms the validity of the signature (a, s); otherwise, the received signature is regarded as an illegal one.
Discussions
After reviewing Abe et al.'s scheme and Schnorr's signature scheme, we observe that Schnorr's signature scheme cannot be employed in Abe et al.'s proposed scheme because the real signer cannot generate the valid signature for other candidate signers. The details are shown in Subsection 5.1. In Subsection 5.2, we show that the type-3M base signature scheme is insecure. More discussions are given in Subsection 5.3.
Another Example
Schnorr's signature scheme in Section 4 is employed in the example in Subsection 3.3. Note that
The following procedures are performed to generate the signature of the message m.
Step 1: U 1 chooses a 1 from
Step 2: z 2 is randomly chosen from Z p′ , s 2 is chosen 
According to Equation (3), it is observed that j i cannot be retrieved because of the difficulties of solving the discrete logarithms and the security of the hash function even though s i , g i , m and y i are known. In other words, only the user who knows x i can generate a i . According to the above analyses, it is ensured that Schnorr's signature scheme cannot be adopted in Abe et al.'s signer-ambiguous signature scheme.
Cryptanalysis of Abe et al.'s Scheme
As shown in [2] , Abe et al. presented an example. The type-3M base signature scheme in Abe et al.'s example is shown as follows. First, two primes, p and q, are chosen, where q = 2p+1. Then, a primitive element g is chosen, where g≠1 and g q mod p =1. Note that g, p, and q are all public. The user U, whose private key is x, possesses the corresponding public key y = g x mod p. When U wants to sign a message m, he/she performs as follows:
Step 1: Chooses a random number r and computes a = g r mod p.
Step 2: Computes s = (r + x* h(m)) mod q.
After the above two steps, U generates the digital signature (a, s) for m. When the verifier V wants to verify the signature, he/she checks whether p mod y * a g
) m ( h s = holds or not. If it holds, V ensures the validity of the signature (a, s); otherwise, the received signature is regarded to be illegal.
In the type-3M base signature scheme, the malicious user Eve can impersonate the legal user U to sign the message at will without knowing U's private key x. The details are shown as follows:
Step 1: Eve chooses the desired message M′.
Step 2: Eve randomly chooses s′∈Z q .
Step 
More Discussions
According to the above analyses shown in Subsections 5.1 and 5.2, the secure type-3M base signature scheme should be modified as follows: The signer commits to a ← A (SK; r), randomly chooses the challenge c and computes s = Z(SK, r, c, a). The verifier checks if a = V(PK, c, s, a) to determine the validity of the signature.
Nevertheless, the modified type-3M signature scheme cannot be employed to Abe et al.'s ignature scheme-Schnorr's signature scheme for example. It is because the message cannot be retrieved if the signature is determined at first in the secure signature scheme. Thus, the real signers cannot generate the partial signature for other signers.
Conclusions
In 2004, Abe et al. proposed a novel threshold signer-ambiguous signature scheme from variety of keys. They claimed that their scheme allows the base signature schemes to be based on sigma-protocols, including Schnorr's signature scheme, or claw-free permutations. After analyzing the above observations, it is observed that the base signature scheme for the keys of the Schnorr-like signature scheme may be insecure and may be designed only for Abe et al.'s scheme. Thus, it is ensured that the base signatures in Abe at al.'s scheme cannot be any one belonging to sigma-protocol or claw-free permutations.
